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Autoethnography: Accept, revise, reject? An evaluative self reflects 
 
Abstract 
In this article I offer some reflections of how my evaluative self goes about 
passing judgment on different kinds of autoethnography. I begin by making 
distinctions between the autobiographical and the autoethnographic before 
raising questions about whether or not self-reflexive accounts of the fieldwork 
process can claim the title of autoethnography. Following this, I consider the 
lists of criteria others have made available to my evaluative self for judging 
analytic, evocative and performance autoethnographies. Having 
acknowledged the dangers and possibilities of such lists attention then turns 
to how my evaluative self might go about judging a selection of 
autoethnographies published in Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and 
Health using multiple criteria from a variety of sources. Rather than being 
purely a cognitive, linear and rational act the process described is messy, 
tentative, contingent, and deeply embodied as my evaluative self feels its way 
towards making certain kinds of judgment calls over others.  
Introduction  
Over the last two decades, across a variety of disciplines, there has been a 
growing interest in the genre of qualitative inquiry known as autoethnography 
as evidenced in books devoted specifically to this topic (e.g., Bochner and 
Ellis, 2016; Chang, 2008; Jones, Adams and Ellis, 2013; Muncey, 2010; 
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Pensoneau-Conway, Adams and Bolen, 2017; Short, Turner and Grant, 2013; 
Turner, Short, Grant, and Adams, 2018). Likewise an increasing number of 
autoethnographic articles have appeared in a range of journals. This growing 
momentum led the University of California Press  to launch in 2020 a new on-
line journal called the Journal of Autoethnography. 
The journal Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health 
(QRSEH) has always been open to receiving autoethnographic work. Indeed, 
an autoethnography by Brendan Stone called Running Man appeared in the 
very first edition of the journal in 2009. Since then, at the time of writing, a 
further 20 autoethnographies have appeared in QRSEH. Of this total of 21, 7 
have the word ‘autoethnography’ in their title while 14 have this word in their 
abstract or as a keyword.  
Of course, if 21 autoethnographies have been accepted for publication 
in QRSEH, normally after undergoing revisions (major to minor) suggested by 
reviewers, then I suspect that many more have been rejected along the way. 
Indeed, as a reviewer, I have rejected some of them in this and other journals 
that I am associated with as either a member of their advisory of editorial 
boards. In working towards making my decision to tick the accept, major 
revisions, minor revisions, or reject box on the QRSEH reviewers form, I put 
myself forward as an evaluative self that passes judgment on the work of 
others.  
Given the power differentials that exist between me and the 
anonymous author(s) of the article in front of me, a great deal of responsibility 
goes with this role, and I take my reviewing duties very seriously indeed. I 
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know all too well the searing pain of having an article rejected and the multiple 
anxieties of making major revisions before the brief serge of exultation when 
the article finally gets accepted for publication. As part of these 
responsibilities, in what follows I offer some reflections on how as an 
evaluative self I go about judging autoethnography in its different guises and 
the ways in which I call upon various criteria to do so as part of a non-linear, 
complex, and messy process of embodied engagement. 
What’s in the name autoethnography?  
For symbolic interactionists, as Charmaz (2006) points out, names classify 
objects and events and convey meanings and distinctions. For her, names 
carry weight, whether light or heavy, they provide ways of knowing and being, 
and are rooted in actions and give rise to specific practices. Thus, when I act 
as an evaluative self and review a journal article, I am sensitive to the names 
chosen by the authors to describe their work as this signals their intents and 
purposes within the framework of a particular tradition of qualitative inquiry.  
So when I read something like,  ‘this article provides an autoethnographic 
account of experience X,’ I begin to expect something that displays the 
general characteristics of this genre. This is my first act of judgment as an 
evaluative self.  
Assisting me in this first judgment is the of work various scholars who, 
without seeking to determine what it is once and for all in an act of closure, 
have proposed a number of key characteristics that they feel bind the genre of 
autoethnography together. For example, Holman Jones, Adams and Ellis 
(2013) list the following characteristics: purposefully commenting on/critiquing 
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of culture practices; making contributions to existing research; embracing 
vulnerability with a purpose; and creating a reciprocal relationship with 
audiences in order to compel a response. Likewise, Manning and Adams 
(2015, 205) state that two essential qualities should be present in all 
autoethnographic projects. 
First, any work labeled ‘autoethnography’ should include personal 
experience and demonstrate, through thoughtful analysis, why this 
experience is meaningful and culturally significant. An essay that does 
not use or describe the importance of personal experience in a cultural 
context should not be considered an autoethnography. Second, this 
personal experience must be reflexively considered through the use of 
extant theory, other scholarly writings about the topic, fieldwork 
observations, analysis of artifacts (e.g., photographs), and/or 
involvement with others (e.g., interviews). If many of these elements 
are not evident, then a project should not be considered an 
autoethnography. 
The thoughts above are echoed directly by Adams and Herrmann (2020), the 
editors of the newly established Journal of Autoethnography, in the guidance 
they offer to those interested in submitting an article to this journal. While they 
do not wish to be prescriptive about what autoethnography is or how to do it, 
Adams and Herrmann state the following. 
What makes a particular work an ‘auteothnography’? 
‘Autoethnography’ is comprised of three interrelated components: 
‘auto,’ ‘ethno,’ and ‘graphy.’ Thus, autoethnographic projects use 
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selfhood, subjectivity, and personal experience (‘auto’) to describe, 
interpret, and represent (‘graphy’) beliefs, practices, and identities of a 
group or culture (‘ethno’). Manuscripts published in this journal must 
engage these components….We expect every manuscript to engage 
with at least some aspects of the ‘auto,’ ‘ethno,’ and ‘graphy,’ and 
these components will inform how we assess manuscripts. (pp. 2-3, 
emphasis added) . 
Such guidance and identifying of characteristics are useful in helping my 
evaluative self to judge if what is being offered to me actually is an 
autoethnography. Often, in the introduction the author tells me they have 
produced an autoethnography but none of these key characteristics are 
present in what follows. Alternatively, the author tells me that their piece 
contains each of the characteristics named by Adams and Herrmann (2020), 
Holman Jones et al. (2013) and/or Manning and Adams (2015) above.  
However, when it comes to showing me these characteristics in action in what 
follows, none of them are present. My conclusion, therefore, is that wherever 
the piece is, it is not an autoethnography and I am obliged to point this out to 
the author in my review. This is a sharp reminder that simply claiming that one 
has produced an autoethnography does not mean that one has actually done 
so. 
The characteristics provided by Adams and Herrmann (2020), Holman 
Jones et al. (2013) and Manning and Adams (2015) also help me reflect on 
the confusions that some authors have regarding autoethnography and other 
genres such as, for example, an autobiography or a confessional tale. 
Regarding the former, Holman Jones et al. point out that while all personal 
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writing could be considered examinations of culture, not all forms of personal 
writing are autoethnographic.  For them, if an author writes to tell a story to 
‘illustrate a sad, joyful, or problematic experience but does not interrogate the 
nuances of this experience in light of general cultural phenomena and cultural 
practices, the author writes autobiographically’ (p. 23). In contrast, they argue, 
if the author takes the same experience, reflects on its nuances, and then 
writes intentionally to show how aspects of this experience  ‘illuminate more 
general cultural phenomena and/or to show how the experience works to 
diminish, silence, or deny certain people and stories, then the author writes 
autoethnographically’ (p. 23).   
The characteristics named above are reinforced when Adams and 
Herrmann (2020)  state that the use of personal experience does not 
automatically make a manuscript autoethnographic.  For this to happen, 
‘personal experience must be used intentionally to illuminate and interrogate 
cultural beliefs, practices, and identities (“ethno”)’ (p. 2).  In some cases this 
can be a fine distinction for sure. A distinction remains nevertheless and often 
articles that claim to be autoethnographic are rejected because they are 
actually autobiographical in nature. 
A similar confusion can arise in relation to confessional tales as 
described by Sparkes (2002a) and Van Maanen (1988) that are distinguished 
by their highly personalised style and their self-absorbed mandate. Thus, 
Fortune and Mair (2011) offer a highly reflexive account of their impact as 
researchers in the production and interpretation of the data generated in their 
ethnographic study of a small sports club in rural Canada to investigate the 
role of such clubs as social and community spaces. As part of this self-
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reflexive process, they draw extensively on their field notes to illustrate and 
problematise how their senses of self and positioning as a graduate assistant 
(Fortune) and an assistant professor (Mair) interacted to shape their 
interactions within the curling club, the kinds of data they collected, and the 
interpretations they consequently made. Specific attention is paid to role 
relationships, forms of participation, performing, personal issues (relating to 
background and experiences), and maintaining balance and distance. Their 
self-revealing text illustrates the problems that ethnographers have to grapple 
with on a regular basis, such as, power, ethics, representation, voice, 
subjectivity and interpretation. 
Having done all the above, and despite being very self-reflexive and 
self-revealing, Fortune and Mair (2011) do not claim their article is an 
autoethnography. Rather, they accurately, in my view, name it as a 
confessional. Others are less precise in their naming and often confuse 
methodological reflections based on their personal experiences (extremely 
important as these are), with autoethnography. Interestingly, in her reflections 
on the current state of autoethnography through her experiences as a 
reviewer of autoethnographic manuscripts, Stahlke Wall (2016) expresses a 
similar concern. Looking back at her reviews she notes a tendency for authors 
to apply the label autoethnography to purposes that might have been labeled 
otherwise before the idea of autoethnography rose to popularity. Stahlke Wall 
notes that one author referred to her work as autoethnographic because she 
was writing about her self-reflections in the process of qualitative data 
analysis in a specific research project.  
As I said to her, I ‘wonder if there is a line between what can be 
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considered autoethnographic and what is perhaps more appropriately 
thought of as accounting for self or locating oneself in the research.’ 
Similarly, another manuscript was essentially ‘a reflection on the 
research process.’ Again, I expressed to the author my concerns about 
using autoethnography as a method in his or her particular case. 
(Stahlke Wall, 2016, 3) 
As part of her reflections, Stahlke Wall (2016) acknowledges that while there 
are certainly blurred boundaries in research, most autoethnographies deal 
with substantive topics/phenomena of sociological interest.  Therefore, based 
on her review of these manuscripts, she concluded that the ‘reflexive analysis 
of research experiences should not be labeled as autoethnographic. Even 
though they serve an important purpose, they are essentially methodological 
articles rather than explorations of substantive social issues’ (p. 4). 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Stahlke Wall’s view, or my comments 
earlier about the confusions between confessional tales and autoethnography, 
they give food for thought to authors about the names they attach to their 
work and whether of not the choice of autoethnography is appropriate for what 
they have actually submitted for review. 
On judging different kinds of autoethnography 
Once my evaluative self has made a judgment on whether or not the article 
submitted actually is an autoethnography, my attention turns its ‘quality’. 
Often, people feel that writing and autoethnography is an easy option. It most 
certainly is not. As Spry (2001) reminds us, the writing of an autoethnography 
must be well crafted and capable of being respected from both a literary and a 
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social scientific point of view. For her, ‘mediocre writing in any venue lacks the 
ability to transform readers and transport them into a place where they are 
motivated to look back on their own personally political identity construction’ 
(p. 713).  Mediocre writing, therefore, is likely to lead to the presentation of a 
mediocre autoethnography that then leads to a rejection. In part, this has led 
me to begin such rejections or calls for major revisions with the following lines. 
I appreciate and thank the author for seeking to share with me his/her 
experiences of (named phenomenon) and its impact on her/his life. 
Unfortunately, having such experiences and attempting to share them 
in written form is no guarantee that a ‘good’ and satisfying 
autoethnography is produced for the reader.  
Following on from this, I often feel obliged to raised issues about the nature of 
the stories told and how they are presented to me as a reader. 
For me the stories provided about the author’s experiences of 
(phenomenon) are problematic. They tend to read as rather flat 
accounts rather than rich descriptions with vivid scenes to 
contextualise the interactions of those involved in ways that take the 
reader into the action. The landscape presented, therefore, is 
somewhat bare. The characters (including that of the author) are 
presented as disembodied beings as opposed to fleshy, rounded, 
complex and nuanced beings. The people mentioned have no 
personalities and no histories and come across as free-floating quotes 
that the author then uses in his/her ‘interpretation section.’ 
Of course, my comments above immediately begs the question as to what I 
feel constitutes a ‘good and satisfying’ autoethnography beyond ‘just’ the 
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quality of the writing? I wish I could give a simple answer but I can’t because 
to do so would insinuate, as a criteriologist might, that I have access to, or 
believe in the possibility of a set or list of foundational, universal, rigid, and 
unmovable criteria that can be applied to anything that claims the name of 
‘autoethnography’ regardless of its intentions and purpose (Sparkes & Smith, 
2009, 2014). This is not the case because just how the characteristics of 
autoethnography outlined by Adams and Herrmann (2020), Holman Jones et 
al. (2013), and Manning and Adams (2015) are played out in practice is very 
much up for grabs and open to a range of interpretations that need to be 
judged accordingly.  
There is no one definitive form or containing category of 
autoethnography owned by individual scholars regarding how it should be 
done, or how it should be represented. Rather, as McMahon (2016) points 
out, there are many variations and possibilities that lead to different kinds of 
autoethnography. Here are but a few on offer: analytic autoethnography 
(Anderson, 2006), Black feminist autoethnography (Griffin, 2012), 
collaborative autoethnography (Chang, 2012), community autoethnography 
(Toyosaki et al., 2009), critical autoethnography (Boylorn & Orbe, 2016), 
evocative autoethnography (Bochner & Ellis, 2016), impressionistic 
autoethnography (Skinner, 2003), indigenous autoethnography (Whitinui, 
2014), interpretive autoethnography (Denzin, 2014), meta-autoethnography 
(Ellis, 2009), performance autoethnography (Denzin, 2018), performative 
autoethnography (Spry, 2011), phenomenological autoethnography (Regina, 
Aguirre & Duncan, 2013), poetic autoethnography (Speedy, 2015), and 
psychoanalytic autoethnography (Garratt, 2014). 
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Given the variation described above, different criteria need to be drawn 
upon for judging these different kinds of autoethnography. Starting from 
scratch this could be an overwhelming task. Assistance has however been 
provided by a number of scholars who have constructed lists of criteria they 
feel are relevant to judging the kind of autoethnography they advocate 
(Sparkes, 2018a, 2018b). To illustrate this point, and for the purposes of 
discussion, I will now consider some lists offered for judging analytic, 
evocative and performance autoethnography. 
Analytic autoethnography 
According to Anderson (2006), analytic autoethnography has the following five 
key features: complete member researcher status, analytic reflexivity, 
narrative visibility of the researcher’s self, dialogue with informants beyond the 
self, and a commitment to theoretical analysis.  For him, the purpose of 
analytic autoethnography is not just about documenting personal experience, 
providing an insider’s perspective or evoking emotional resonance with the 
reader. Rather it is about, using empirical data ‘to gain insight into some 
broader set of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves’ 
(p. 387). In this respect, according to McMahon (2016, 307), analytic 
autoethnography represents a more ‘traditional scientific’ autoethnographic 
approach, ‘with a focus both on telling readers what the tale is about and how 
it should, ideally, be read.’  
Drawing on Anderson’s (2006) work, others have developed his approach 
and the criteria used to judge both its processes and products. For example, 
speaking of how health researchers can produce desirable (i.e., analytic) 
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autoethnographies that potentially contribute to advancing health-related 
knowledge, Chang (2016, 448) offers the following five standards (i.e., 
criteria) for judging the quality of such work. 
• Authentic and Trustworthy Data: Does the autoethnography use 
authentic and trustworthy data? 
• Accountable Research Process: Does the autoethnography follow a 
reliable research process and show the process clearly? 
• Ethics Toward Others and Self: Does the autoethnography follow 
ethical steps to protect the rights of self and others presented and 
implicated in the autoethnography? 
• Sociocultural Analysis and Interpretation: Does the autoethnography 
analyze and interpret the sociocultural meaning of the author’s 
personal experiences? 
• Scholarly Contribution: Does the autoethnography attempt to make a 
scholarly contribution with its conclusion and engagement of the 
existing literature?  
Like Anderson (2006), Chang (2016, 445) also signals that her criteria, along 
with her suggestions for what she describes as probably the most systematic 
process of autoethnographic research proposed regarding data collection, 
organization, analysis, and interpretation, ‘may stand contrasted with more 
fluid approaches of evocative and narrative autoethnography and of 
interpretive and performative autoethnography’.  
Evocative autoethnography 
According to McMahon (2016), evocative autoethnography can also be 
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referred to emotional autoethnography. For her, this kind of autoethnography 
involves a literary approach to research that seeks to show rather than tell the 
reader about the subjective emotional experiences of the author. This 
showing accomplished by creating compelling stories that invite the reader to 
feel an emotional resonance and connection with the author, as well as gain 
an understanding of the culture central to the story being told. 
With regard to evaluating evocative autoethnography Bochner and Ellis 
(2016) offer some reflections in the form of a conversation between them and 
a group of students. They point out that depending upon the kind of 
autoethnography you are doing, the criteria by which it should be evaluated 
will be different. For Bochner and Ellis, if you are aspiring do something akin 
to analytic autoethnography, then the criteria ‘should be more social scientific, 
such as considerations of validity, data collection, categorization processes, 
and generalizability across cases’ (p. 212). If, however, you aspire to an 
evocative form of autoethnography then, they suggest, you will not be so 
concerned with these issues. To illustrate this point, as part of their 
conversation with their students, Bochner offers the following list of criteria he 
uses for evaluating evocative autoethnography. 
• I look for abundant, concrete details. I want to feel the flesh and 
blood emotions of people coping with life’s contingencies.  
• I am attracted to structurally complex narratives that are told in a 
temporal framework representing the curve of time. 
• I also reflect on the author’s emotional credibility, vulnerability, 
and honesty. I expect evocative autoethnographers to examine 
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their actions and dig underneath them, displaying the self on the 
page, taking a measure of life’s limitations, of cultural scripts that 
resist transformation, of contradictory feelings, ambivalence, and 
layers of subjectivity, squeezing comedy out of life’s tragedies. 
•  I also prefer narratives that express a tale of two selves, one 
that shows a believable journey from who I was to who I am, 
and how a life course can be reimagined or transformed by 
crisis.  
• I hold the author to a demanding standard of ethical self-
consciousness … I want the writer to show concern for how 
other people in the teller’s story are portrayed, for the kind of 
person one becomes in telling one’s story, and to provide space 
for the listener’s becoming.  
• I want a story that moves me, my heart and belly as well as my 
head; I want a story that doesn’t just refer to subjective life, but 
instead acts it out in ways that show me what life feels like now 
and what it can mean. (Bochner & Ellis, 2016: 212- 213). 
Performance autoethnography 
In performance autoethnography, according to McMahon (2016, 309), the 
autoethnographer/story teller/researcher can be likened to the lead actor in 
their own story through a theatrical performance that ‘brings to life or to the 
stage/theatre transcribed or text-based lived experience’. Here, she suggests, 
the lead actor ‘enacts the performance in storied form, particularly in terms of 
the specific cultural context within the performance’ (p. 309).  
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Reflecting upon the possibilities of criteria for evaluating performance 
autoethnography, Holman Jones (2005, 773) developed a list of actions and 
accomplishments she looks for in the work of others. These are as follows:  
• Participation as reciprocity: How well does the work construct 
participation of authors/readers and performer/audiences as a 
reciprocal relationship marked by mutual responsibility and obligation? 
• Partiality, reflexivity, and citationality as strategies for dialogue (and 
not mastery): How well does the work present a partial and self-
referential tale that connects with other stories, ideas, discourses, and 
contexts (e.g., personal, theoretical, ideological, cultural) as a means 
of creating a dialogue among authors, readers, and subjects 
written/read? 
• Dialogue as a space of debate and negotiation: How well does the 
work create a space for and engage in meaningful dialogue among 
different bodies, hearts, and minds? 
• Personal narrative and storytelling as an obligation to critique: How do 
narrative and story enact an ethical obligation to critique subject 
positions, acts, and received notions of expertise and justice within 
and outside of the work? 
• Evocation and emotion as incitements to action. How well does the 
work create a plausible and visceral lifeworld and charged emotional 
atmosphere as an incitement to act within and outside the context of 
the work? 
• Engaged embodiment as a condition for change. How does the work 
place/embody/interrogate/intervene in experience in ways that make 
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political action and change possible in and outside the work?  
Similarly, Denzin (2018, 197) offers the following criteria to help us evaluate 
whether or not performance texts are successful, or not, in accomplishing the 
following: 
• Unsettle, criticize and challenge taken-for-granted, repressed 
meanings 
• Invite moral and ethical dialogue while reflexively clarifying their own 
moral position 
• Engender resistance and offer utopian thoughts about how things can 
be made different 
• Demonstrate that they care, that they are kind 
• Show, instead of tell, while using the rule that less is more 
• Exhibit interpretive sufficiency, representational adequacy, and 
authentic adequacy 
• Are political, functional, collective, and committed.  
Working with lists: Dangers and possibilities for the evaluative self 
The lists provided above by others for how my evaluative self might pass 
judgment on different kinds of autoethnography (or any form of qualitative 
inquiry) are both helpful and dangerous (Sparkes, 2018a, 2018b). They are 
dangerous in that they can provide a false sense of security.  Here, all I have 
to do if the author claims their work to be analytic, evocative or performance 
based, or uses words that suggest it is one of these types, is to take the list of 
criteria attached to each one by the scholars above (assuming that I 
understand what they actually mean by their criteria) and apply them directly 
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to the piece in front of me. Such a mechanistic, prescriptive, and normative 
application of a list, however, can serve a strong exclusionary and legitimation 
function by regulating the boundaries of specific forms of autoethnography 
and thereby control its practitioners in punitive ways.  
Lists can quickly become a rigid and inflexible quality appraisal 
‘checklist’ that is then used by the evaluative self to set standards of ‘quality 
control.’  Thus, the lists proposed above by Anderson, Chang, Bochner and 
Ellis, Holman Jones, and Denzin become the lists for judging their preferred 
genres of autoethnography at the exclusion of all others. The list then 
operates as a fixed recipe that all must follow which then leads to rigid 
standardization at the cost of innovation. In such circumstances, as Gingrich-
Philbrook (2013) points out, the checklist gets confused for a meta-language 
and something that is universally endorsed. Such lists, he argues, can too 
quickly get converted into a magic contract for power relations whereby the 
evaluative self proceeds to make publication assessments guided by that view 
that any absence of criteria from the list should be defined as a ‘deficit’ in the 
work.  Smith and Deemer (2000, 888) clearly warn against such an approach: 
 
The use of the term list should not be taken to mean that we are 
referring to something like an enclosed and precisely specified or 
specifiable shopping or laundry list. Put differently, to talk of a list in this 
sense is not at all to talk about, for example, an accumulation of 20 
items, scaled 1 to 5, where everyone’s presentation proposal is then 
numerically scored with a cutoff point for acceptance. Obviously, to 
think of a list in these terms is to miss the entire point.  
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For my evaluative self to avoid missing the entire point, Smith and Deemer 
(2000) suggest that any list of criteria, or characteristics as they call them, 
should be seen as always open-ended, and ever subject to constant 
reinterpretation so that items can be added to the list or taken away. 
Therefore, the criteria used to judge a piece of research can change 
depending upon the context and the purposes. This is because a 
characteristic of research we thought important at one time and in one place 
may take on diminished importance at another time and place.  
From the more flexible position and relativistic position advocated 
above, Barone and Eisner (2012) argue that any list of criteria on offer, 
including their own for arts-based inquiry, are to be used as cues for 
perception and starting points for thinking that may be useful and relevant to 
the work they are encountering at the time. My evaluative self in taking any list 
of criteria as a cue for perception and a starting point is crucial in addressing 
another danger of lists. The danger here is that lists imply that different types 
of autoethnography are pure and discreet entities with hermetically sealed 
and impermeable boundaries. That is, each type is mutually exclusive, and 
one either does analytic autoethnography, or one does evocative 
autoethnography, or one does performance autoethnography in accordance 
with specific lists of criteria for each genre. No mixing is possible. Such a view 
is highly problematic and, in my experience, does not hold up to scrutiny1. 
 Analytic autoethnography, for example, can include evocation and 
emotionally rich texts and this is not incompatible with analysis. Both Hayler 
(2013) and Winkler (2018), therefore, reject the notion that evocative and 
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analytic autoethnography need be mutually exclusive, and note that a fruitful 
combination can enlarge the spectrum of autoethnographic research and 
open up further possibilities for development. All of which leads Tedlock 
(2013) to call for the braiding of evocative with analytic autoethnography in 
ways that produce powerful writing about the self in the world in order to help 
change the world.  
Against the backdrop described above, Tullis (2013, 245) believes that 
autoethnography ‘exists on a continuum from highly fluid and artistic to 
formulaic and highly analytic.’ Likewise, Stahlke Wall (2016, 3) argues that the 
‘dichotomy of evocative versus analytic autoethnography is more a continuum 
than a binary, and there are examples of autoethnographic work that fall at all 
points along it.’ In terms of a continuum, Manning and Adams (2015) identify 
the four common orientations that many autoethnographers use to design, 
conduct, represent, and evaluate autoethnographic projects. These are as 
follows: social scientific autoethnography (i.e., analytic autoethnography in 
Anderson’s, 2006, terms); interpretive-humanistic autoethnography; critical 
autoethnography; and creative-artistic autoethnographies.  
Importantly, Manning and Adams (2015, 191) point out that although 
they list four distinct orientations, ‘it is not unusual for autoethnographers to 
blend the goals and techniques of each in a single project or as they write 
about the same experiences over time’. Likewise, Adams and Herrmann 
(2020, 3) note the following. 
Some manuscripts will foreground personal experience (‘auto’) and 
evocative representation (‘graphy’) but may implicitly reference extant 
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research or discern patterns of social interaction (‘ethno’). Some 
manuscripts will use personal experience (‘auto’) alongside formal 
interviews or artifacts (‘ethno’) but may be more structured with 
representing the research (’graphy’). 
 All the views expressed above suggest that the boundaries of 
autoethnographic types or orientations in terms of the balance between 
showing and telling, and the lists of criteria associated with them, should not 
be viewed as rigidly bounded systems but as something more permeable and 
fluid in nature, which allows them to be used in a creative rather than a 
conservative and formulaic manner.  
Reflections of my evaluative self on a selection of autoethnographies 
published in QRSEH2 
The need for my evaluative self to be flexible and creative in selecting criteria 
for judging different forms of autoethnography rather than a slave to any given 
list is made evident in my following reflections on a number of 
autoethographies published in QRSEH that have braided the analytic with the 
evocative. For example, in what constitutes a collaborative autoethnography, 
Ing and Mills (2019) provide some evocative and well-crafted stories about 
Ing’s experiences in sport as a youngster living with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and his feelings when, as a new coach at a 
football academy working with a team of 10 year olds he has to deal with an 
incident between two players, one of whom he later learns has ADHD.  
To begin with Ing and Mills open with an explanation of ADHD. Then, 
following Sparkes (2004) they employ a personal and academic voice 
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framework in order to highlight the differences between relived experiences 
(i.e. personal voice) and sections that provide explanation and signpost the 
readers to useful scholarly content (i.e. academic voice).  Thus, a story of 
‘losing it’ is told in a personal voice before the authors step back to reflect on 
the meanings of this story using their ‘academic voice’ that draws upon the 
literature and is analytic in nature. The same braiding process takes place 
with the next story, ‘It’s not just me’ which is told in a personal voice followed 
by the analytic reflections of the academic voice. The discussion that closes 
the article considers the implications of what the stories reveal about living 
with ADHD in relation to practices and policies in sport. This combination of 
showing and telling by Ing and Mills succeeds in combining the power of the 
personal perspective with the value of analysis and theory as advocated by 
Stahlke Wall (2016). 
A similar strategy of combining his personal voice in the form of rich, 
contextualized vignettes and his academic (analytic) voice is used by Mills 
(2015) as he explores his experiences of constructing, deconstructing and 
partially reconstructing his coaching identity over time. Likewise, Cronin, 
Ryrie, Huntley and Hayton (2018) juxtapose relativist vignettes (personal 
voice) with academic voices that analyse each vignette as part of their co-
constructed autoethnography that, by drawing on observational data, 
reflective field notes, and interviews proceeds to examine Cronin’s 
experiences as a basketball coach who enters a youth club for disabled 
participants for the first time. 
 Other authors in QRSEH have also fruitfully combined personal stories 
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with analytic reflections framed by various theories and concepts to assist the 
reader in making their interpretations. For example, Scarfe and Marlow (2015) 
offer a phenomenologically informed autoethnography of the first author’s 
identity conflict as a runner when she is diagnosed with epilepsy, and her 
ensuing identity dilemmas when she returns to running after this diagnosis. In 
contrast, Zehntner and McMahon (2014) draw on Foucauldian theory to 
explore the first author’s experiences as a swimming coach and her mentor-
mentee relationships as shaped within the culture of Australian swimming. 
Likewise, Peers (2012) draws on Foucauldian theory but also connects to 
critical disability theory to interrogate the role of parasport in the formation, 
disciplining and internalizing of his own (in)coherent  disabled Paralympian 
identity. The work of Foucault also informs the work of Gibson (2012) but is 
integrated with the literature on consumerism, the culture industry, techno-
science and cyborg theory to explore how these interact to shape the 
experiences of runners, and their practices when they buy running shoes.  
The work cited above, make clear the inappropriateness of my 
evaluative self applying just the list of criteria for analytic autoethnography 
proposed by Chang (2016), or just the list of criteria for evocative 
autoethnography proposed by Bochner and Ellis (2016) when passing 
judgment. Each list is simply not sufficient on its own for doing a fair and 
proper job. Given that the authors above have skillfully combined the analytic 
and evocative in their autoethnographies then, at the very least, my evaluative 
self must select relevant criteria from both these lists (and others) in judging 
such work. Thus, for example, following Chang I can ask whether or not an 
article makes a scholarly contribution in terms of its conclusion and 
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engagement with the existing literature, and I can also ask following Bochner 
and Ellis if the personal stories presented express a tale of two selves, one 
that shows a believable journey from who the author was to who they are 
now, and how a life course can be reimagined or transformed by the 
experiences they have encountered along the way.  
As an evaluative self my selection and mixing from various lists of 
criteria will necessarily be influenced by the balance of telling and showing in 
the autoethnography on offer and where I feel the author positions themselves 
on this continuum. This is particularly so in relation to work that aspires to 
evoke a response from the reader. Thus, in seeking to produce an evocative 
autoethnographic text that interrogates and explores novel engagements  
(both his own and those of readers) with mind/body (dis)connections  in ways 
that invite readers to engage with rather the than simply read (i.e. be told) 
about his (dis)embodied experiences, Laurendeau (2019)  opts to emphasize 
showing over telling. For sure, some academic references are cited on one 
page of the article but the majority are located in the notes section at the end. 
This clearing of academic references and the telling that accompanies this, 
opens up the space for Laurendeau to craft a layered, embodied, 
introspective and relational story that tries to understand and express what he 
is thinking, feeling and experiencing physically as he attempts to adapt 
gracefully in his ageing body.  
In relation to Laurendeau’s work, I am immediately drawn to the criteria 
contained in the list offered by Bochner and Ellis’ (2016) for evocative 
autoethnography in terms of looking for abundant, concrete details, wanting to 
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feel the flesh and blood emotions of people coping with life’s contingencies, 
and being attracted to structurally complex narratives that are told in a 
temporal framework representing the curve of time. Given the performance 
dynamics of Laurendeau’s stories, however, I am also drawn to criteria in the 
lists provided by Denzin (2018) and Holman Jones (2005) in terms of how the 
text unsettles, criticizes and challenges taken-for-granted, repressed 
meanings and creates a space for engaging in meaningful dialogue among 
different bodies, hearts, and minds. But then I think about other relevant 
criteria from different lists that are available such as the one offered by 
Barone (2011) as he reflects on the twelve contrasts that he feels exist 
between a flat piece and an engaging piece. I am drawn to many of his 
contrasts such as the following one.  
The flat piece, a cold dinner, is forced down, taken in with little 
pleasure. It lacks the heat of the chef’s passions, the chef’s sensuous 
self who knows, without spice, all is bland. The engaging piece makes 
each mouthful worthy of comment, encourages lingering, savoring, 
remembering. In it’s presence, I want to invite my colleagues and 
students to enjoy its flavors. (p. 666) 
The process described above regarding the ways in which my evaluative self 
gets drawn towards some criteria over others from different sources when 
passing judgment on evocative authoethnographies is far from being a purely 
cognitive, rational, and linear process. Rather it is deeply embodied. For sure, 
my head is involved but so is my heart and my viscera as I not only think 
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about the stories I read but also with them in terms of their relationship with 
me as a similarly aged, vulnerable, corporeal and enfleshed being.  
My evaluative self goes though a similar, but never an identical 
process, when I engage with other autoethnographies that rely more on 
showing rather than telling, such as, the embodied, introspective and 
relational story provided by Ellis (2015) of her gradual adaption over time to 
the chronic pain and deterioration caused by osteoarthritis in her hip. 
Likewise, Stone (2009) only cites one academic reference in his evocative 
autoethnography which explores his experiences of anorexia, excessive 
exercising and psychosis, and which links the starvation of the body to the 
repression of traumatic memory. Again, as with the work of Laurendeau 
(2019), I am drawn to some of the criteria provided by Bochner and Ellis 
(2016), Holman Jones (2005), and Denzin (2018).  
I am also drawn to some of the criteria in the list offered by Barone and 
Eisner (2012) for judging arts based research. For example, they speak of 
concision. This criterion pertains to the degree to which the arts based 
research ‘occupies the minimal amount of space or includes the least amount 
of verbiage necessary for it to serve its primary, heuristic purpose of enabling 
members of the audience to see social phenomena from a fresh perspective’ 
(p. 148). In thinking about the concision of the article in front of me, I then 
connect to the following characteristic provided by Barone (2011, 666) 
whereby the engaging piece ‘knows just how to dress for the occasion, 
perhaps adorning itself in the unfamiliar but always with an eye toward making 
any flourish and expressive part of the whole. Instead of ostentatious display, 
its design encourages further conversation.’ This rhizomic process continues 
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as I engage with the story being told and make connections with criteria that I 
feel, but never know for sure, are relevant and appropriate to what I think the 
author is trying to achieve in their work.  
The rhizomic process involved in making judgments is invoked once 
again when I engage with performance autoethnography as described earlier, 
and offered by Douglas (2014) in her four act play called Revised Reshaped 
Reclaimed. Here, drawing upon her previous experiences as professional 
golfer, the performance autoethnography crafted by Douglas is intended to 
explore the tensions, contradictions and consequences of stories in elite sport 
and raise questions about how the socially constructed physical ‘I’ is created 
by those with interpretive privilege, such as, those in the sports news media. 
She does this by using sports media stories collected over a 14-year period 
about her that focused on ‘sporting excellence’, and contrasts these with diary 
extracts, stories, poems and songs, written by her to generate an alternative 
reflexive understanding of her self, identity and life playing professional sport. 
This data forms the basis of Revised Reshaped Reclaimed.  
In terms of passing judgment on the performance autoethnography I 
am assisted by the analytic reflections provided by Douglas at the end of her 
article that assist the reader by offering guidance on how events portrayed in 
Revised Reshaped Reclaimed might be interpreted. Here, she draws on 
narrative theory to make the case that her work offers a counterstory that 
challenges and resists the oppressive dynamics of the dominant cultural 
narrative in sport that revolves around performance. For her, this counterstory 
sets out to repair damage inflicted by an oppressive dominant narrative, free 
her moral agency, provide a template for other athletes to consider their 
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identities and relationships, and also be an act of purposive moral self-
definition. Given this political intent, I am drawn to the thoughts of Holman 
Jones (2005) regarding engaged embodiment as a condition for change, and 
how the counterstory offered by Douglas works to 
place/embody/interrogate/intervene in experience in ways that make political 
action and change possible in and outside the work. Linked to this are 
Denzin’s (2018) criteria of whether or not the performance autoethnography 
unsettles, criticizes, and challenges taken-for-granted, repressed meanings, 
engenders resistance and offers utopian thoughts about how things can be 
made different. 
As before, my use of criteria is not confined to those included in lists 
developed by Denzin (2018) and Holman Jones (2005) specifically for judging 
performance autoethnography. Again, I am drawn to the list of criteria 
provided by Barone and Eisner (2012) for arts based research in terms of 
concision as explained above in relation to me judging evocative 
autoethnographies. As I reflect on the article by Douglas (2014), I also think 
about how Barone and Eisner say that a good piece of arts based research 
should illuminate a terrain, a process, an individual in ways that sheds light by 
defamiliarizing an object or process so that it can be seen in a way that is 
entirely different from how it might be seen when customary modes of 
perception operate. From this, I move to Barone’s (2011, 666) observation 
that an engaging piece  ‘exists in struggle, searching for what it may come to 
realize. It becomes a small, nervous solution, offered with humility. Its ideas 
slide into cautions claims, noting its limitations.’  
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But, of course, given the permeable boundaries that exist between 
different types of autoethnography, these same thoughts can also occupy me 
when I read an evocative autoethnography. It also needs to be noted that my 
comments about the kind of criteria I might call upon to judge the performance 
autoethnography offered by Douglas (2014) are based on me reading this as 
a written text, and not seeing/hearing it as a live performance on the stage 
with an audience reacting to it.  Here, as Cho and Trent (2009, 11) point out, 
the performance in use involves  ‘transacting the lived experiences of others 
to audiences by means of voices and bodies of the performer(s).’ Given this 
change in transactional context in which, as Pelias (1992) reminds us, the 
performer carries the obligation to fashion an aesthetic form while I as an 
audience member have the burden of response, then, once again, my modes 
of judgment will necessarily shift accordingly. 
Closing comment 
If nothing else, I hope that the reflections of my evaluative self reveal the 
complexities, for me at least, of passing judgment on different forms of 
autoethnography. It’s a messy, tentative, contingent process in which I feel my 
way into the piece in front of me, reading it multiple times with gaps in 
between where a cocktail of thoughts and emotions mingle in my body as I 
drift towards certain kinds of judgment call over others3.  
As evidenced above, my evaluative self draws on lists of criteria 
provided by others with specific interests, both personal and political, for 
promoting their lists over others. These lists are certainly useful as starting 
points but they are not enough on their own. As Le Roux (2017) emphasizes 
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any set of lists cannot substitute for informed judgment and that any appraisal 
of autoethnographies should be subject to individual judgment based on 
insight and experience. This appeal to insight, imagination, and informed, 
principled judgment is echoed in the notion of the connoisseur advocated by 
Sparkes and Smith (2009, 2014) that involves the art of appreciation and the 
ability to make fine-grained discriminations among complex and subtle 
qualities (Eisner, 1991). Whether or not my evaluative self actually does 
achieve the status of the connoisseur when it comes to judging 
autoethnography, or any other kind of qualitative research, is open to 
question. But, at least I aspire to do so and, I guess, that’s the best I can do. 
Notes 
 
1 This experience includes my own forays into the domain of autoethnography 
where I have tried to braid evocative storytelling with various forms of 
conceptual analysis (e.g., see Sparkes, 1996, 2002b, 2003, 2007, 2012, 
2013, 2016; Sparkes & Smith, 2012). 
2 The reader should not assume that the author reviewed any of the articles 
cited in this section. 
3 Some of the criteria I have drawn on to pass judgment on autoethnography 
could also be used to judge ethnographic nonfictions and other creative 
analytic practices. Regardless of the genre and the criteria drawn upon, for 
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